The Triple-P Essay: Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism in Works of Philosophy.
By Robert Hanna
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The Triple-P Essay: Presentational Hylomorphism and Polymorphism in Works of Philosophy
The truly important philosophy of the past has always been expressed in truly creative and highly original presentational formats — I mean, truly creative and highly original presentational formats in that historical and social-institutional context, although they may have been widely imitated later. Consider, compare, and contrast, for example, (i) Plato’s dialogues, (ii) Aristotle’s lectures, (iii) Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, (iv) Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy, (v) Augustine’s Confessions, (vi) Descartes’s Meditations, (vii) Spinoza’s Ethics, (viii) Leibniz’s Monadology, (ix) Kant’s first Critique, (x) Hegel’s Phenomenology, (xi) Schopenhauer’s Parerga and Paralipomena, (xii) Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous romantic sermonizing essay-novellas, (xiii) Nietzsche’s aphoristic books and Zarathustra, (xiv) Wittgenstein’s modernist prose-poem of philosophical logic, the Tractatus, (xv) Heidegger’s Being and Time, and (xvi) Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. This undeniable fact, in turn corresponds to two profoundly important meta-philosophical principles that I’m going to assert and unpack: (i) the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, and (ii) the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy.
But before I do that, I need to define “works of philosophy.” Here’s a proposal for five disjunctively necessary, individually minimally sufficient, and collectively fully sufficient criteria for something W — where W is a “work,” that is, any intentional human product, whether an object (material or intentional), or performance — to count as “a work of philosophy”: (i) W provides a philosophical theory or a visionary worldview (or both), (ii) W negatively or positively engages with earlier or contemporary philosophical ideas, (iii) W expresses and follows a philosophical method, (iv) W contains an explicit or implicit “philosophy of philosophy,” a meta-philosophy, and (v) W deals with some topic or topics germane to the rational human condition, within a maximally broad range of issues, encompassing epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, history, culture, society, politics, aesthetics, art, formal and natural science, religion, and so-on.
Given how I’ve just defined the term “work,” by my use of the term “works” in the phrase “works of philosophy,” I mean something at least as broad as its use in “works of art.” So there is no assumption or presupposition whatsoever here that works of philosophy must be written or spoken texts, although obviously many or most works of philosophy have been and are written or spoken texts. Correspondingly, the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, and the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy both flow from this notion of a work of philosophy.
The thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy says:
There is an essential connection, and in particular, an essential complementarity, between the presentational form (morphê) of philosophical works and their philosophical content (hyle).[i]
“Content” here is cognitive-semantic content, but this content can be either (i) conceptual, or (ii) essentially non-conceptual, and also it can be either (iii) theoretical content, or (iv) non-theoretical content, including, aesthetic/artistic, affective/emotive, pragmatic, moral, political, or religious content. Moreover, (i) and (ii) cross-cut with (iii) and (iv). Hence there can be conceptual content that is either theoretical (for example, in the natural or formal sciences) or non-theoretical (for example, in everyday life), and there can be essentially non-conceptual content that is either theoretical (for example, in pure or applied mathematics — see, e.g., Hanna, 2015: chs. 2, 7, and 8) or non-theoretical (for example, in our everyday, essentially embodied, affective/emotional, sense-perceptual, imaginative, or practical lives).
The thesis of presentational hylomophism in works of philosophy immediately implies three things.
First, it implies that there is an intimate and indeed essential connection between truly creative, highly original works of philosophy, and truly creative, highly original forms of literary and spoken philosophical expression. Thus Socrates created philosophical works entirely by conversation; Plato did it by writing dialogues; Aristotle did it by presenting (it seems) nothing but lectures; Descartes wrote meditations; Locke and Hume wrote treatises; Kant wrote Critiques; Kierkegaard wrote strange pseudonymous books; Nietzsche wrote poetry and aphorisms; Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, both of them completely original, completely different, and equally uncategorizable; and so on.
Second, it implies that since all works of written and spoken philosophy are essentially connected to their literary style and expressive vehicles, then it is a mistake to impose a needlessly restrictive stylistic and expressive straight-jacket on works of philosophy, for example, the standard 25–30 page professional “journal essay,” “200+ page book,” and “philosophy talk.”
And third, it implies that since the standard view of philosophical content in the Analytic tradition — whether as logical analysis, linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, Analytic metaphysics, or scientific naturalism — is that the content of philosophy is exclusively conceptual and theoretical, then recognizing the essential non-conceptuality and non-theoreticality of philosophical content, completely opens up the way we should be thinking about works of philosophy, in three ways.
First, all written and spoken philosophy is in fact shot through with imagery, poetry, rhetorical devices, and speech-acts of various kinds.
Second, philosophy need not necessarily be presented (exclusively) in written or spoken form. There could be works of philosophy that are cinematic, diagrammed or drawn, painted, photographed, musical (instrumental or voiced), sculpted, performed like dances or plays, etc., etc., and perhaps above all, mixed works combining written or spoken forms of presentation and one or more non-linguistic forms or vehicles.
And third, if philosophical content is as apt to be essentially non-conceptual or non-theoretical as it is to be conceptual or theoretical, then there are vast realms of philosophical meaning that very few philosophers, even the most brilliant and great ones, have ever even attempted to explore.
Therefore, in full view of the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, we also have the thesis of presentational polymorphism in works of philosophy:
Philosophy can be expressed in any presentational format whatsoever, provided that it satisfies the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy.
Now, I fully accept Susan Haack’s distinction between philosophy as a calling and as a profession:
[M]y topic here: the difference between philosophy as an academic profession and philosophy as a calling, a vocation if you will — not, I should add, in a religious sense, but in the sense in which we might describe nursing, for example, as (for some) a calling. This cuts across the distinction between professional and amateur. Though both the amateur and the philosopher with a calling would continue to do philosophy even if they weren’t paid to do so; at least, in my mouth “calling” is not intended to have any of the unfavorable connotation “amateurish” has acquired, that hint of “minor league, not major league”. When I speak of those who have a calling I have in mind those who could do philosophy seriously, genuinely trying to figure things out, even if they weren’t paid to do so. An obvious example is Peirce, who worked steadily and productively at philosophy, logic, semiotic, history of science, etc., long before and for decades after Hopkins fired him. (Haack, 2021: p. 38)
When you pursue philosophy as a calling, you do it for its own sake, whatever the Diogenes-like consequences might be; but when you pursue philosophy as a profession, you do it mainly or even only in order to have a good career, make lots of money, and achieve upper middle class social status.
So, if you pursue philosophy as a calling, what will the philosophy of the future look like? I’ve argued that it must be broadly Kantian in content (Hanna, 2024a). But what about its presentational format? In answer to my calling, since I exited professional academic philosophy in 2016, alongside other longer projects, I’ve written a series of roughly 150 pithy, polemical, and punchy essays that lay claim to exemplifying a new presentational format: the triple-P essay. Triple-P essays are relatively short, include at least one relevant image, emphatically make one single point or develop one single line of argument, are edgy and provocative, and often autobiographical or personal. Therefore, the triple-P essay is my candidate for being a model or paradigm of the presentational format of future works of philosophy. The essay you’re currently reading is not itself a triple-P essay, but instead about works of philosophy in general, and about triple-P essays in particular. So it’s a meta-triple-P essay. It satisfies the thesis of presentational hylomorphism in works of philosophy, but not in the specifically pithy, polemical, and punchy way that first-order triple-P essays do.
Can I present some examples of first-order triple-P essays? If I had to choose 10 favorite essays from among the roughly 150 I mentioned above, they would be these: (i) “On Rutger Bregman’s Humankind: Optimism For Realists, Or, Neither Hobbes Nor Rousseau” (Hanna, 2020/2024), (ii) “Philosophy With Basic Income But Without Professional Academic Incentives” (Hanna, 2022/2024), (iii) “On Fundamental Philosophical Disagreements” Hanna, 2023a), (iv) “WTFU: The Manifesto of The Nobodies” (Hanna, 2023b), (v) “Empirical Science With Uncertainty But Without Reproducibility” (Hanna, 2023c), (vi) “Higher Education Without Commodification, Mechanization, or Moralization” (Hanna, 2024b), (vii) “Philosophia Longa, Vita Brevis”(Hanna, 2024c), (viii) “Gun Crazy: A Moral Argument For Gun Abolitionism” (Hanna, 2024d), and (ix) “Notes from the Philosophical Underground” (Hanna, 2024e). And these are all first-order triple-P essays. But I’d also include one more traditionally-formatted and longer essay in my list of favorites, simply because of its highly orginal philosophical content: (x) “Caveat Lector: The Philosophy of Reading” (Hanna, 2024f).
In any case, the essays are all posted online for universal free sharing and as food for thought, so you can judge for yourself whether they satisfy the theses of presentational hylomorphism and polymorphism.[ii]
NOTES
[i] For a similar thesis, although restricted to written works of philosophy, see (Stewart, 2013; and also Allen, 2014).
[ii] I’m grateful to Otto Paans for proposing an initial version of the list of criteria for what counts as a work of philosophy, and more generally, for thought-provoking correspondence on and around the topics of this essay.
REFERENCES
(Allen, 2014). Allen, K. “Review of Jon Stewart’s The Unity of Content and Form in Philosophical Writing: The Perils of Conformity.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 17 March. Available online at URL = <https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/he-unity-of-content-and-form-in-philosophical-writing-the-perils-of-conformity/>.
(Haack, 2021). Haack, S. “Philosophy as a Profession, and as a Calling.” Syzetesis 8: 33–51. Available online at URL = <https://www.syzetesis.it/doc/rivista/archivio/2021/02-Haack.pdf>.
(Hanna, 2015). Hanna, R. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge . THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Available online in preview HERE.
(Hanna, 2020/2024). Hanna, R. “On Rutger Bregman’s Humankind: Optimism For Realists, Or, Neither Hobbes Nor Rousseau.” Unpublished MS. Available online HERE.
(Hanna, 2022/2024). Hanna, R. “Philosophy With Basic Income But Without Professional Academic Incentives.” Unpublished MS. Available online HERE.
(Hanna, 2023a). Hanna, R. “On Fundamental Philosophical Disagreements.” Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/104471713/On_Fundamental_Philosophical_Disagreements_July_2023_version_>.
(Hanna, 2023b). Hanna, R. “WTFU: The Manifesto of The Nobodies.” Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/93043230/WTFU_The_Manifesto_of_The_Nobodies_August_2023_version_>.
(Hanna, 2023c). Hanna, R. “Empirical Science With Uncertainty But Without Reproducibility.” Unpublished MS. Available online HERE.
(Hanna, 2024a). Hanna, R. “Kantian Futurism.” Journal of Philosophical Investigations 18, 47: 1–8. Available online at URL = <https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18254.html?lang=en>.
(Hanna, 2024b). Hanna, R. “Higher Education Without Commodification, Mechanization, or Moralization.” Unpublished MS. Available online HERE.
(Hanna, 2024c). Hanna, R. “Philosophia Longa, Vita Brevis.” Unpublished MS, Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/101135795/Philosophia_Longa_Vita_Brevis_February_2024_version_>.
(Hanna, 2024d). Hanna, R. “Gun Crazy: A Moral Argument For Gun Abolitionism.” Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/61516955/Gun_Crazy_A_Moral_Argument_For_Gun_Abolitionism_March_2024_version_>.
(Hanna, 2024e). Hanna, R. “Notes from the Philosophical Underground.” Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/122574986/Notes_from_the_Philosophical_Underground_August_2024_version_>.
(Hanna, 2024e). Hanna, R. “Caveat Lector: The Philosophy of Reading.” Unpublished MS. Available online at URL = <https://www.academia.edu/123521014/Caveat_Lector_The_Philosophy_of_Reading_September_2024_version_>.
(Stewart, 2013). Stewart, J. The Unity of Content and Form in Philosophical Writing: The Perils of Conformity. London: Bloomsbury.
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