THE LIMITS OF SENSE AND REASON: A Line-By-Line Critical Commentary on Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” #5–Aix-xii/GW99–101, Preface to the First (A) Edition.
By Robert Hanna
[I] was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title, “The Limits of Sense and Reason.” I planned to have it consist of two parts, a theoretical and a practical. The first part would have two sections, (1) general phenomenology and (2) metaphysics, but this only with regard to its method. (Letter to Marcus Herz, 21 February 1772 [C 10: 129])
CPR TEXT Aix-xii/GW99–101 Preface to the First (A) Edition
(Aix) In the beginning, under the administration of the dogmatists, her rule was despotic. Yet because her legislation still retained traces of ancient barbarism, this rule gradually degenerated through internal wars into complete anarchy; and the skeptics, a kind of nomads who abhor all permanent cultivation of the soil, shattered civil unity from time to time. But since there were fortunately only a few of them, they could not prevent the dogmatists from continually attempting to rebuild, though never according to a plan unanimously accepted among themselves. Once in recent times it even seemed as though an end would be put to all these controversies, the lawfulnessa of all the competing claims would be completely decided, through a certain physiology of the human understanding (by the famous Locke); but it turned out that although the birth of the purported queen was traced to the rabble of common experience and her pretensions would therefore have been rightly rendered suspicious, nevertheless she still asserted her claims, because in fact this genealogy was attributed to her falsely; thus metaphysics (Ax) fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism, and thus into the same position of contempt out of which the science was to have been extricated. Now after all paths (as we persuade ourselves) have been tried in vain, what rules is tedium and complete indifferentism, the mother of chaos night in the sciences, but at the same time also the origin, or at least the prelude, of their incipient transformation and enlightenment, when through ill-applied effort they have become obscure, confused, and useless.
For it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent. Moreover, however much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging the language of the schools for a popular style, these so-called indifferentists, to the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they yet professed so much to despise. Nevertheless this indifference, occurring amid the flourishing of all sciences, and directed precisely at those sciences whose resultsb (if such are to be had at all) we could least do without, is a (Axi) phenomenon deserving our attention and reflection. This is evidently the effect not of the thoughtlessness of our age, but of its ripened power of judgment,* which will no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands that reason take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge,a to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees (Axii) but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.
a Rechtmässigkeit b Kenntnisse * [Footnote: see LSR, installment #6.]
COMMENTARY ON Aix-xii/GW99–101 Preface to the First (A) Edition
Back now to unfortunate Hecuba, fallen “queen of all the sciences,” namely classical metaphysics and especially classical Rationalist metaphysics.
Within this metaphorical frame, now rhetorically extended to an analogy with the political history of pre-Enlightenment despotism, Kant sketches an apocalyptic history of the rise and fall of 17th and 18th century European metaphysics.
The basic details are these.
The metaphysical theories of classical 17th or early 18th century Rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten were dogmatic, Scholastic, and highly narrow and restrictive, as regards philosophical method, form, and content (“despotic,” and retaining “traces of ancient barbarism”).
As a consequence, classical Rationalism and especially Leinizian-Wolffian Scholastic Rationalism, was wide open to highly effective critical attacks by a few Empiricist skeptics, especially including Hume,
a kind of nomads who abhor all permanent civilization, [and who] shattered civil unity from time to time.
Kant’s deployment of the notion of philosophical nomads, that is, free-thinking philosophers who operate outside the professional academic philosophical State of Kant’s day — namely, university-based classical Rationalist metaphysics in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition — is extremely interesting.
In the 1980s, Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari used this Kantian notion as the critical jumping-off point for what they call nomadology,[i] a version of post-Structuralist, liberationist thinking in which literally “anything goes” as regards the method, form, or content of philosophy.
Deleuze-and-Guattari’s nomadology is flamboyantly pluralistic, to the point of explicit relativism and syncretism, aka bricolage.
This line of thinking, in turn, is closely associated with late 20th century French philosophical and political anarchism as developed, for example, by Pierre Clastres and Hakim Bey.[ii]
Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari completely overlook the possibility that there is more than enough room in Kant’s own writings — especially in “What is Enlightenment?” and in his post-Critical writings, especially Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason — for a specifically Kantian version of philosophical and political anarchism, and for a philosophical nomadology that is fully grounded in Kantian radical enlightenment.[iii]
Indeed, in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant explicitly describes a special class of intellectual nomads he calls
unincorporated (zunftfrei) scholars, who do not belong to the university but simply work on part of the great content of learning, either forming independent organizations, like various workshops … or living, so to speak, in a state of nature so far as learning is concerned, each working by himself as an amateur and without public precepts or rules, at extending [his field of] learning. (CF 7: 19)
Now, imagine a special class of philosophical nomads, “living, so to speak, in a state of nature so far as [philosophy] is concerned, each working by himself as an amateur and without public precepts or rules, at extending [philosophy].”
But although the classical Leibnizian-Wolffian Rationalists did attempt to reply to the attacks of the specifically Humean Empiricist skeptic brand of philosophical nomads, they did so only in a piecemeal, largely unsuccessful way, without any decisive resolution (“continually attempting to rebuild, though never according to a plan unanimously accepted among themselves”).
The result was philosophical confusion and endless controversy.
For a brief period in the late 17th century, however, it seemed that Locke’s 1689 Essay Concerning Human Understanding might resolve the controversies, by the application of its positive Empiricist epistemology and philosophical psychology to the analysis of the human faculty for understanding or Verstand (“a certain physiology of the human understanding”).
Yet although Locke’s Essay plausibly argued that necessarily, all human cognition has its causal origins in human experience (“the birth of the purported queen was traced to the rabble of common experience”), his overall positive Empiricist line of argument ultimately failed because of some basic flaws (“this genealogy was attributed to her falsely”), and classical Rationalist metaphysics was able simply to re-assert its basic principles and stubbornly hold the line (“metaphysics fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism”).
The result of this unresolved Rationalist-Empiricist dialectic was that by the time Kant came on the philosphical scene — namely, the latter half of the 18th century — many or even most uncommitted philosophers were intellectually bored to death by the whole enterprise and simply refused to take sides, or to undertake any fruitful or new philosophical work (“what rules is tedium and complete indifferentism”), so that the science of metaphysics was, in effect, going to hell in a handbasket (“the mother of chaos and night in the sciences”).
Kant’s notion of “complete indifferentism” is what I will call zombie-like agnosticism, that is, the intellectually lifeless, mechanical and puppet-like, empty-headedly and heartlessly rote refusal to advance from cognitive neutrality to any sort of deeper, responsibly-held belief or authentic commitment.
In other words, it’s cognitive inauthenticity in the existential sense.[iv]
At this point, before going on to look at Kant’s extremely interesting philosophical riff on “indifferentism” per se — namely, on agnosticism — I want to pull back for a moment and ask two critical questions:
(i) Is Kant’s apocalyptic history of the rise and fall of 17th and 18th century metaphysics in fact accurate?
(ii) What, according to Kant, precisely were the basic mistakes in Locke’s “physiology of the human understanding”?
In answer to question (i), I do think that yes, Kant’s story about the rise and fall of 17th and 18th century metaphysics is in fact quite accurate, assuming that one takes a suitably high-level point of view on the philosophical doctrines and texts he is talking about.
It is of course possible to zoom in, study classical 17th and 18th century metaphysics, especially including classical Rationalist metaphysics and classical Empiricist metaphysics, from a greatly resolved perspective, track sideways across the several metaphysical theories, note many non-trivial differences between them, deploy both interpretive charity and revisionist zeal, and then discover important tensions between what is actually written there, on the ground, and Kant’s high-level philosophical picture of it — and, in fact, discover important tensions between what is actually written there, on the ground, and any high-level philosophical picture of it.
But the very same hermeneutic point holds of every piece of good and interesting philosophy that was ever or will be written, and therefore the scholarly zoom-in and track-sideways strategy does not materially affect the high-level truth of Kant’s claims.
The science of metaphysics was indeed going to hell in a handbasket in the latter half of the 18th century, and for precisely the reasons Kant gives.
In answer to the equally important question (ii), as we will see later — most clearly, perhaps, in the B Introduction and the B Transcendental Aesthetic — according to Kant, Locke’s positive classical Empiricist theory of human cognition makes two basic mistakes.
First, according to Kant, Locke’s theory confuses a true strong modal claim about the causal-sensory origins of the content, truth, and justification of human cognition, namely,
(i) all human cognition begins in causally-triggered sense experience,
with a false strong modal claim about the strict determination of the content, truth, and justification of human cognition, namely,
(ii) the content, truth, and justification of all human cognition is either reducible to or strictly determined by causally-triggered sense experience.
Even if it is true that necessarily, all human cognition begins in causally-triggered sensory experience, it simply does not follow that necessarily, the content, truth, and justification of all human cognition is determined by causally-triggered sensory experience.
This is because it remains really possible that even though necessarily, all human cognition begins in causally-triggered sensory experience, nevertheless, necessarily, the content, truth, and justification of human cognition are all at least partially determined by non-sensory, non-empirical, and non-contingent factors.
And that, as we shall see, is precisely what Kant holds.
But Locke’s classical Empiricist theory of human cognition asserts the denial of this claim.
So if Kant is right, then Locke’s theory of human cognition commits the serious classical Empiricist fallacy of confusing the necessary causal-sensory origins of human cognitionwith the strict determination of human cognition as to its inherently normative content-based, truth-based, and justification-based features.
To compound Locke’s problems, thesis (ii), in turn, entails the highly questionable doctrine of what late 19th-century and early 20th century philosophers, following Frege’s and especially Edmund Husserl’s widely-influential critical attacks on this doctrine, called psychologism.[v]
Second, according to Kant, Locke’s theory of “primary qualities” and “secondary qualities,” along with Locke’s corresponding theory of ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities, is false.
The falsity of Locke’s primary-secondary doctrine is of course a standard thesis of Hume’s skeptical Empiricism, and also of Berkeley’s skeptical subjective idealism.
But there are two essentially different ways of denying Locke’s theory.
It is one thing to deny Locke’s theory by holding
(i) that all primary qualities are ultimately nothing but secondary qualities, and
(ii) that all ideas of primary qualities are ultimately nothing but ideas of secondary qualities.
That’s what Hume and Berkeley hold.
Nevertheless, it is something fundamentally different to deny Locke’s theory by holding
(i) that there are no really such things as either primary qualities or secondary qualities, and
(ii) that there are really no such things as either ideas of primary qualities or ideas of secondary qualities, because
(iii) the one and only world that rational human beings do in fact objectively cognize, and can ever possibly objectively cognize, by means of ordinary sense perception, ordinary empirical judgment, and also by means of the exact sciences and their several different kinds of synthetic a priori judgments, is necessarily filled with authentic (empirically real, manifest) appearances or phenomena exclusively, and necessarily never contains any things-in-themselves or noumena.
And this too is precisely what Kant holds.
We left the fallen queen of all the sciences — classical metaphysics and especially classical Rationalist metaphysics in the second half of the 18th century — on the verge of descending into chaos, night, and barking madness like unfortunate Hecuba, due to the “complete indifferentism,” or zombie-like agnosticism, of contemporary 18th century philosophers.
Kant’s important metaphilosophical thought here is that the very same complete indifferentism or zombie-like agnosticism that threatens to drive philosophy down to cognitive Hades, also contains at least the anticipation of a revolutionary philosophical turn (“transformation and enlightenment”).
But in order to spell out Kant’s important thought, we need to get clearer on the very idea of agnosticism.
Generally speaking, agnosticism is the negative doxic attitude of comprehensive non-belief or suspension of judgment.
More specifically characterized, a cognitive subject X is agnostic or indifferent that P if and only if X does not believe that P and X does not believe that not-P.
As characterized in this way, agnosticism is then to be contrasted with the slightly more limited negative doxic attitude of doubt.
More specifically, a cognitive subject X doubts that P if and only if either X does not believe that P or X believes that not-P.
Thus every form of agnosticism includes doubt, but not all forms of doubt are agnostic.
Both Locke and Hume had fruitfully explored the negative doxic attitudes of agnosticism and doubt, but Kant pushes those explorations significantly beyond those of the classical Empiricists.
I have already characterized “complete indifferentism,” aka zombie-like agnosticism, as the intellectually lifeless, mechanical and puppet-like, empty-headedly and heartlessly rote refusal to advance from cognitive neutrality to any sort of deeper, responsibly-held belief or authentic commitment.
Another distinct form of agnosticism, which for clarity’s sake I will dub constructive agnosticism or constructive indifferentism, consists in a doxic attitude of reasonable cognitive neutrality or open-mindedness, and in a cautious refusal to take a stand until all the relevant evidence is in.
Constructive agnosticism or indifferentism follows naturally from the act or process of reasonable doubt that Hume characterizes as mitigated skepticism.
Mitigated skepticism leading to constructive agnosticism or indifferentism is fully appropriate in everyday reasoning, exact science, and legal contexts, for example, in an ordinary well-conducted court of law.
In such contexts, the presiding judge should deploy reasonable doubt and remain in a doxic attitude or state that is constructively agnostic or indifferent until it is appropriate to form a judgment, given all the relevant evidence.
This, in turn, is sharply opposed to what I will call destructive agnosticism or destructive indifferentism, which consists in a deeply regressive doxic attitude of cognitive paralysis or self-annihilating confusion in the face of “obscurity and contradictions,” essentially similar to what the Stoic radical skeptics called “equipollence.”
The end result of destructive agnosticism or indifferentism is doxic nihilism, that is, not only the refusal to proceed in appropriate evidential circumstances from cognitive neutrality or open-mindedness to judgment, but also the serious attempt to devastate and undermine any attempt to break out of this state of cognitive neutrality.
Doxic nihilism is therefore one giant step beyond complete indifferentism or zombie-like agnosticism.
It is when the latter turns into a fully devolutionary and regressive cognitive counterforce — zombies with razor-sharp teeth, hence flesh-eating, intellect-eating monsters.
Destructive agnosticism or indifferentism follows naturally from the corrosive and radical form of skepticism that Hume dubs Pyrrhonian skepticism, which seeks to undermine the grounds of all rational belief, and which in fact is a direct attack on human rationality itself.
A good example of the doxic nihilism of destructive agnosticism or indifferentism is debunking strategies and error theories, especially as applied to ethics.[vi]
As we have already seen, the underlying cause of destructive agnosticism or indifferentism, and equally of the pathological mechanism of Pyrrhonian radical equipollence skepticism in its application to classical metaphysics and especially classsical Rationalist metaphysics, is vicious impredicative reasoning, together with its absolute, ill-founded, noumenal sets or totalities, and its antinomies/paradoxes/hyper-contradictions/dialetheias.
So Kant is saying that this is the intellectual killer-zombie abyss and apocalypse where metaphysics as a science could end up forever, if some radical metaphysical therapy is not carried out, fast.
According to Kant, moreover, this radical metaphysical therapy turns on a third form of indifferentism or agnosticism, that is, a radical form of non-belief or suspension of judgment that is in sharp contrast to either zombie-like agnosticism, constructive agnosticism, or destructive agnosticism.
This essentially more robust negative doxic attitude, or what I will call radical agnosticism or radical indifferentism, is in fact a higher-order state of negative self-knowledge: a higher-order state of knowing that it is impossible for me to know some first-order object or state of affairs, one way or the other.
This can be more carefully spelled out.
Call any such first-order object, X, and call any such first-order state of affairs, the state of affairs that P.
Then radical agnosticism about X and the state of affairs that P is knowing that it is impossible for me to know whether it is either true of X that P or false of X that P.
Kant holds that the mature rational human faculty or power of judgment, or Urteilskraft, is capable of advancing to radical agnosticism about the “illusory knowledge” (Scheinwissen) dogmatically postulated by classical metaphysics, and especially classical Rationalist metaphysics.
That is, our faculty of judgment can advance to the higher-order negative self-knowledge that it is impossible for us to know any objects or states of affairs beyond the limits of human experience, one way or the other.
For example, we can have the higher-order negative self-knowledge that it is impossible for us to know whether an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good (aka “a 3-O”)
God exists or does not exist, whether noumenal agent-causal libertarian freedom exists or does not exist, and whether immortality of the soul exists or does not exist.
Similarly, as I noted above — and not altogether coincidentally, in view of what we already know about the explicitly anti-Kantian project of Logicism — Gödel proved in 1931 that there are unprovable sentences in classical second-order logic plus enough of Peano’s five axioms for arithmetic.
Consider, now, any such unprovable sentence of Peano arithmetic.
By means of Gödel’s Incompleteness proof, we have the higher-order logical self-knowledge that it is impossible for us to know, by means of proof-theoretic means alone, whether this sentence is true or false.
Given Gödel’s radically agnostic 1931 result, it nevertheless remains possible that the truth of unprovable sentences of Peano arithmetic is knowable by non-proof-theoretic means, for example, by rational intuition.
In the 1960s, Gödel asserted that the truth of unprovable sentences of Peano arithmetic, and also the truth of the seemingly unprovable Continuum Hypothesis, could be known by means of essentially conceptual rational intuition, although he did not adequately explain how this is really possible.
But Kantian intuition or Anschauung, as I will argue below, in my commentary on and reconstruction of the Transcendental Aesthetic, is essentially non-conceptual.
So, given Gödel’s radically agnostic 1931 result, it also remains possible that the truth of unprovable sentences of Peano arithmetic, and also the truth of The Continuum Hypothesis, are knowable by essentially non-conceptual rational intuition in Kant’s sense.[vii]
In any case, as we have seen, the inherently reasonable process of mitigated skepticism leads to constructive agnosticism or indifferentism, and the inherently anti-reasonable process of Pyrrhonian radical skepticism, i.e., destructive agnosticism or indifferentism, leads to doxic nihilism.
For Kant, the paradigmatically philosophical rational process of self-criticism that leads to the higher-order negative self-knowledge of radical agnosticism or indifferentism is nothing more and nothing less than the critique of pure reason.
This rational process of self-criticism is paradigmatically philosophical, just insofar as it fully captures and also fully clarifies the epistemic force of Socratic Ignorance.
The truly Critical philosopher knows only that she cannot know all and only those objects and states of affairs that transcend the limits of human experience, that is, she cannot know all and only noumena or things-in-themselves, either as to their nature or their existence, one way or the other.
Now stepping fully back from the rhetorical devices he has currently in play — his mythological metaphorical frame and his apocalyptic history — and addressing the philosophical reader directly, Kant states explicitly that the critique of pure reason is not merely a negatively self-knowing analysis of philosophical books and metaphysical systems.
On the contrary, the critique of pure reason is a negatively self-knowing analysis of something far more fundamental than books and systems, namely the faculty of human reason itself, insofar as it purports to cognize “independently of all experience.”
If it can be known, according to the legitimate higher-order reflexive epistemic principles of the critique of pure reason, that it is impossible for us to know the sorts of objects and states of affairs that classical metaphysics, and especially classical Rationalist metaphysics, purports to know, one way or the other, then it is knowable that classical metaphysics, and especially classical Rationalist metaphysics, is impossible.
In this sense, the critique of pure reason is not directly analogous to an ordinary or first-order court of law in which the faculty of human reason is either the Pyrrhonian or mitigated skeptical prosecutor, or presiding judge, about ordinary first-order experiential objects and matters of fact.
On the contrary, the critique of pure reason is instead directly analogous to a higher-order reflexive court of law in which the faculty of human reason itself is being critically examined and aptly/wisely judged by the faculty of human reason itself.
This new metaphorical frame, which presents an analogy between the critique of pure reason and apt/wise judgment in a higher-order reflexive court of law, re-appears at various points in the CPR.
In this particular connection one important critical question, to which I will also return later in more detail, needs to be noted:
How can human reason critically examine and judge itself without there being a fundamental rational incoherence — that is, without there being, in effect, a fundamental epistemic “conflict of interest” whereby one and the same faculty is simultaneously in a state of self-knowledge and also in a state of self-ignorance?
The answer is that this would be a problem for Kant only if it were assumed by him that the faculty of human reason is structurally flat or linear.
But according to Kant, human reason is inherently hierarchical or multi-level, and not flat or linear: human reason is inherently structured so as to be both first-order and also higher-order reflexive, up to any nth higher level.
As long as we do not confuse the several distinct levels or orders within human reason’s innate constitution, then there is no rational incoherence.
Indeed rational incoherence results precisely from an attempt to collapse all the levels or orders downwards into one flat or linear structure, and thereby to deny that human reason has an essentially hierarchical reflexive architecture.
Here Kant’s transcendental idealist conception of the rational self as inherently hierarchical, reflexive, and dynamic should also be sharply contrasted, on the one hand, with the classical Rationalist conception of the self as a flat unchanging thinking substance, and, on the other hand, with Hume’s Pyrrhonian skeptical Empiricist conception of the self as an inherently unstructured, temporally-successive bundle of impressions and ideas.[viii]
It must also be noted, however, that in some places Hume seems to assert that the self is an inherently and immanently structured temporally-successive bundle of impressions and ideas, as. for example, when he says:
I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts.[ix]
To the extent that Hume holds this far more subtle and indeed mitigated skeptical view of the self — rejecting the classical Rationalist doctrine of the soul, but also proposing a “republican” or structuralist conception of the self — his doctrine is far more akin to Kant’s.
[i] G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Nomadology: The War Machine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Semiotext(e), 1986).
[ii] See, for example, P. Clastres, Society Against the State, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1987); and H. Bey, T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism (1987), available online at URL = <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/hakim-bey-t-a-z-the-temporary-autonomous-zone-ontological-anarchy-poetic-terrorism>.
[iii] See, for example, R. Hanna, “Radical Enlightenment: Existential Kantian Cosmopolitan Anarchism, With a Concluding Quasi-Federalist Postscipt,” in D. Heidemann and K. Stoppenbrink (eds.), Join, Or Die: Philosophical Foundations of Federalism (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), pp. 63–90; R. Hanna, “Exiting the State and Debunking the State of Nature,” Con-Textos Kantianos 5 (2017), available online at URL = <https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/228>; and R. Hanna, Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism: A Theological-Political Treatise (THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, vol. 4) (New York: Nova Science, 2018), available online in preview HERE.
[iv] Correspondingly, I cannot resist comparing the intellectual condition of “tedium and complete indifferentism,” which in turn is “the mother of chaos and night in the sciences,” in post-1750s European philosophy, to the cognitive night of the living dead that is mainstream professional academic philosophy in the first two decades of the 21st century.
[v] See E. Husserl, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2. vols., trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970), vol. 1, 51–247; R. Hanna, “Husserl’s Arguments against Logical Psychologism,” in V. Mayer (ed.), Husserls Logische Untersuchungen (Munich: Akademie Verlag, 2008), pp. 27–42; R. Hanna, Rationality and Logic (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), ch. 1, available online in preview HERE; and M. Kusch, Psychologism (London: Routledge, 1995).
[vi] See, for example, F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966); F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 13–163; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the New Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1975); M. Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1973), ch. 9; J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977); R. Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); and R. Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
[vii] See for example, Hanna, Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge (THE RATIONAL HUMAN CONDITION, vol. 5) (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015), pp. 391–392.
[viii] D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), book I, part IV, section vi, pp. 251–263, and Appendix, pp. 633–636.
[ix] Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, book I, part IV, section vi, p. 261.
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