THE FATE OF ANALYSIS, #9–Russell’s Philosophy Before The Tractatus.

By Robert Hanna



II. Classical Analytic Philosophy

II.1 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Is: Two Basic Theses

II.2 What Classical Analytic Philosophy Officially Isn’t: Its Conflicted Anti-Kantianism

II.3 Classical Analytic Philosophy Characterized in Simple, Subtler, and Subtlest Ways

II.4 Three Kinds of Analysis: Decompositional, Transformative, and Conceptual

II.5 Frege, The First Founding Father of Classical Analytic Philosophy

II.6 Frege’s Project of (Transformative or Reductive) Analysis

II.7 Frege’s Dead End

II.8 Frege’s Semantics of Sense and Reference, aka Meaning

II.9 Some Biggish Problems For Frege’s Semantics

II.10 Husserl, Logic, and Logical Psychologism, aka LP

II.11 What LP is, and its Three Cardinal Sins

II.12 Husserl’s Three Basic Arguments Against LP

II.13 Has Husserl Begged the Question Against LP? Enter The Logocentric Predicament, and a Husserlian Way Out

II. Moore, Brentano, Husserl, Judgment, Anti-Idealism, and Meinong’s World

III.1 G.E. Moore, the Second Founding Father of Classical Analytic Philosophy

III.2 Brentano on Phenomenology, Mental Phenomena, and Intentionality

III.3 Husserl on Phenomenology and Intentionality

III.4 Moore and the Nature of Judgment

III.5 Moore and the Refutation of Idealism

III.6 Meinong’s World

IV. Russell, Unlimited Logicism, Acquaintance, and Description

IV.1 Russell Beyond Brentano, Husserl, Moore, and Meinong

IV.2 Russell and Mathematical Logic versus Kant

IV.3 Russell’s Unlimited Logicist Project

IV.4 Pursued by Logical Furies: Russell’s Paradox Again

IV.5 Russell’s ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Meaning

IV.6 Knowledge-by-Acquaintance and Knowledge-by-Description

IV.7 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

IV.8 Russell’s Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment

IV.9 Russellian Analysis, Early Wittgenstein, and Impredicativity Again

IV.10 Russell and The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

V. Wittgenstein and the Tractatus 1: The Title, and Propositions 1–2.063

V.1 A Brief Synopsis of the Tractatus

V.2 The Tractatus in Context

V.3 The Basic Structure of the Tractatus: A Simple Picture

V.4 Tractarian Ontology

V.5 Reconstructing Wittgenstein’s Reasoning

V.6 What Are the Objects or Things?

V.7 The Role of Logic in Tractarian Ontology

V.8 Colorless Objects/Things

V.9 Tractarian Ontology, Necessity, and Contingency

V.10 Some Initial Worries, and Some Possible Wittgensteinian Counter-Moves

VI. Wittgenstein and the Tractatus 2: Propositions 2.013–5.55

VI.1 What is Logical Space? What is Real Space?

VI.2 Atomic Facts Necessarily Are in Manifest or Phenomenal Space, But Objects or Things Themselves Necessarily Aren’t in Manifest or Phenomenal Space

VI.3 Logical Space is Essentially More Comprehensive than Manifest or Phenomenal Space

VI.4 Why There Can’t/Kant Be a Non-Logical World

VI.5 A Worry About Wittgenstein’s Conception of Logic: Non-Classical Logics

VI.6 What is a Tractarian Proposition?

VI.7 Naming Objects or Things, and Picturing Atomic Facts

VI.8 Signs, Symbols, Sense, Truth, and Judgment

VI.9 Propositions Again

VI.10 Language and Thought

VII. Wittgenstein and the Tractatus 3: Propositions 4–5.61

VII.1 The Logocentric Predicament, Version 3.0: Justifying Deduction

VII.2 The Logical Form of Deduction

VII.3 Logic Must Take Care of Itself

VII.4 Tautologies and Contradictions

VII.5 What is Logic?

VII.6 Logic is the A Priori Essence of Language

VII.7 Logic is the A Priori Essence of Thought

VII.8 Logic is the A Priori Essence of the World

VIII. Wittgenstein and the Tractatus 4: Propositions 5.62–7

VIII.1 Tractarian Solipsism and Tractarian Realism

VIII.2 Tractarian Solipsism

VIII.3 Tractarian Realism

VIII.4 Is the Tractatus’s Point an Ethical One?

VIII.5 The Meaning of Life

VIII.6 Three Basic Worries About the Tractatus

VIII.7 Natural Science and the Worry About the Simplicity of the Objects or Things

VIII.8 Natural Science and the Worry About the Logical Independence of Atomic Facts

VIII.9 Tractarian Mysticism and the Worry About Metaphilosophy

IX. Carnap, The Vienna Circle, Logical Empiricism, and The Great Divide

IX.1 Carnap Before and After the Tractatus

IX.2 Carnap, The Vienna Circle, and The Elimination of Metaphysics

IX.3 The Verifiability Principle and Its Fate

IX.4 The Davos Conference and The Great Divide

X. Wittgenstein and the Investigations 1: Preface, and §§1–27

X.1 From the Tractatus to the Investigations

X.2 The Thesis That Meaning Is Use

X.3 A Map of the Investigations

X.4 The Critique of Pure Reference: What the Builders Did

XI. Wittgenstein and the Investigations 2: §§28–242

XI.1 The Picture Theory and the Vices of Simplicity

XI.2 Wittgenstein’s Argument Against The Picture Theory: A Rational Reconstruction

XI.3 Understanding and Rule-Following

XI.4 Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox: The Basic Rationale

XI.5 Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox: A Rational Reconstruction

XI.6 Kripkenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox: Why Read Kripke Too?

XI.7 Kripkenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox: A Rational Reconstruction

XI.8 How to Solve The Paradox: Wittgenstein’s Way and Kripkenstein’s Way

XI.8.1 Wittgenstein and The Rule-Following Paradox: A Rational Reconstruction

XI.8.2 Kripkenstein and The Rule-Following Paradox: A Rational Reconstruction

XII. Wittgenstein and the Investigations 3: §§242–315

XII.1 What is a Private Language?

XII.2 The Private Language Argument: A Rational Reconstruction

XII.3 Is Wittgenstein a Behaviorist? No.

XII.4 Wittgenstein on Meanings, Sensations, and Human Mindedness: A Rational Reconstruction

XIII. Wittgenstein and the Investigations 4: §§316–693 & 174e-232e

XIII.1 Linguistic Phenomenology

XIII.2 Two Kinds of Seeing

XIII.3 Experiencing the Meaning of a Word

XIII.4 The Critique of Logical Analysis, and Logic-As-Grammar

XIV. Coda: Wittgenstein and Kantianism

XIV.1 World-Conformity 1: Kant, Transcendental Idealism, and Empirical Realism

XIV.2 World-Conformity 2: Wittgenstein, Transcendental Solipsism, and Pure Realism

XIV.3 World-Conformity 3: To Forms of Life

XIV.4 The Critique of Self-Alienated Philosophy 1: Kant’s Critical Metaphilosophy

XIV.5 The Critique of Self-Alienated Philosophy 2: Wittgensteinian Analysis as Critique

XV. From Quine to Kripke and Analytic Metaphysics: The Adventures of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

XV.1 Two Urban Legends of Post-Empiricism

XV.2 A Very Brief History of The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

XV.3 Why the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Really Matters

XV.4 Quine’s Critique of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, and a Meta-Critique

XV.5 Three Dogmas of Post-Quineanism

XVI. Analytic Philosophy and The Ash-Heap of History

XVI.1 Husserl’s Crisis and Our Crisis

XVI.2 Why Hasn’t Post-Classical Analytic Philosophy Produced Any Important Ideas in the Last Thirty-Five Years?

XVI.3 On Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being, Or, It’s The End Of Analytic Philosophy As We Know It (And I Feel Fine)

XVI.4 Thinking Inside and Outside the Fly-Bottle: The New Poverty of Philosophy and Its Second Copernican Revolution


But you can also read or download a .pdf version of the complete book HERE.


IV.5 Russell’s ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Meaning

Thus ‘Fido’ means Fido.

More generally, for Russell

(i) proper names such as ‘Ludwig’ mean an individual object or thing,

(ii) general terms such as ‘philosopher’ mean universals, e.g., the concept or property of being a philosopher, and

(iii) logical words such as ‘is’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if …. then’, ‘if and only if’, ‘all’, ‘some’, etc., all mean logical objects of some sort, e.g., Copula, Conjunction, Disjunction, Negation, Conditionalization, Biconditionalization, Universal Quantification, Particular Quantification, etc.

Since Russell‘s ‘Fido’-Fido theory of meaning is one-factor, he rejected Frege‘s two-factor theory, and therefore he also rejected Frege’s basic distinction between sense and reference/Meaning.

Indeed, one of the most contorted and puzzling passages in all of classical Analytic philosophy occurs in Russell’s “On Denoting” — itself supposedly a paradigm of philosophical analysis — when Russell attempts to criticize Frege’s theory of sense and reference by reformulating it as a very confused version of his own ‘Fido’-Fido theory.[i]

This unintentionally farcical passage, which nowadays reads like an early version of Sokal’s Hoax, is known as The Gray’s Elegy Argument.[ii]

IV.6 Knowledge-by-Acquaintance and Knowledge-by-Description

(i) intuitions (Anschauungen) and

(ii) concepts (Begriffe).[iii]

Kant‘s notion of intuition, in turn, Russell understood in the very broad sense of the notion of a “presentation of an object,” as developed by Meinong.

Like Kant, Russell distinguishes sharply between two basic types of cognition:

(i) knowledge-by-description, or knowledge that’s mediated by the ascription of identifying properties to the objects of cognition, and

(ii) knowledge-by-acquaintance, or direct and unmediated infallible awareness of the object of cognition.

But whereas Kant had held that all of our meaningful cognition contains an intuitional component, Russell holds a fairly quite narrow view of the scope of acquaintance: we can be acquainted with abstract universals in rational intuition, and with concrete sense data in sense perception, and that‘s it.

Thus Russell holds that most of our knowledge is by-description only.

At the same time however Russell also holds that I cannot understand a sentence or a word unless I am acquainted with every one of its meaningful parts (I’ll call this Russell‘s principle of acquaintance for linguistic understanding), which, when taken along with the ‘Fido’-Fido theory of meaning, implies that I cannot understand the meaning of a sentence (i.e., a proposition) unless I am acquainted with each of the things the several words of that sentence stand for.

IV.7 Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

(i) with all the universals picked out by general terms such as ‘present king of France’ and also

(ii) with all the logical objects picked out by logical words such as ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘some’, and ‘all’,

in order to understand those phrases.

In most cases, however, we are not also acquainted with the objects that are described by those definite or indefinite descriptions, so our knowledge of those objects is purely descriptive or identificational in character.

This in turn is connected directly to one of Russell‘s leading contributions to classical Analytic philosophy: his idea that there is a sharp difference between

(i) the grammatical form, aka “natural or ordinary language syntax,” aka “surface grammar,” of a proposition, and

(ii) the underlying logical form, aka “logical syntax,” aka “depth grammar,” of that proposition.

The primary example of this is terms in natural or ordinary language that appear to be names and thus to stand for particular things, but actually aren‘t names, because they in fact mean parts of general propositions.

Hence they are incomplete symbols, aka “syncategorematic terms,” that have meaning only in the context of larger complexes of symbols, and not on their own.

Symbols that have meaning on their own, such as ‘Russell’ or ‘logician’ or ‘Russell is a logician’ are complete symbols, aka “categorematic terms.”

E.g., in the meaningful sentence (hence a complete symbol and categorematic term)

PKF: The present King of France is bald

the definite description ‘The present king of France’ may seem to be a name.

But if it’s a meaningful name, then it stands for an object that doesn’t exist, of which it’s impossible to decide whether it’s bald or not.

So sentence PKF seems to have no definite truth-value.

Russell’s analysis of sentence PKF is that

The present king of France is bald

actually means the same as

There is one and only one present king of France and he is bald

which is false if there are no present kings of France, or if there is more than one present king of France, or if there is one and only one present king of France and he is not bald, and true otherwise.

So definite descriptions of the form ‘the F’ aren’t names at all and in fact are incomplete symbols or syncategorematic terms belonging to larger propositional complexes, and mean the same as ‘there exists an F and only one F’, which, in standard logical symbols is

(Э x) [Fx & (y) (Fy –> y = x)]

Translating sentence PKF using this model, we get

(Э x) {[PKFx & (y) (PKFy –> y = x)] & Bx}

Here we can see that the symbol

(Э x) [PKFx & (y) (PKFy –> y = x)]

occurs meaningfully only within the larger propositional complex that translates sentence PKF, hence it’s an incomplete symbol or syncategorematic term.

This analysis can also be extended to most of the names in natural language, since it’s true that for most names, e.g., ‘Socrates’, we are not actually acquainted with the bearers of those names, and yet we also know what those names mean.

So Russell proposed that most ordinary names are in fact disguised definite descriptions.

IV.8 Russell’s Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment

And according to Frege, propositions are the senses expressed by those complete meaningful indicative sentences that have a truth-value as their Meaning.

But according to Russell, a proposition is nothing but the “complex” consisting of the class or set of things with which we are acquainted when we understand a sentence.

This implies, for instance, that for Russell, in the case of the sentence

Wittgenstein is shorter than Frege

the proposition expressed by that sentence literally contains Wittgenstein, Frege, and the “shorter than” relation.

This striking view, in turn, is intimately connected with Moore‘s and Russell‘s radically realist “revolt against idealism”:

if all propositions are literally composed of real mind-independent things, then semantic facts are mind-independent facts, and cannot be ideal or mind-dependent.

One problem with this radically realistic view of the proposition, however, is the problem of the unity of the proposition:

what accounts for the ordered character of the elements in the proposition, such that they go together in such a way as to constitute something that is definitely true or false?

Given the set of three propositional elements (Wittgenstein, Frege, shorter than), what makes it the case that the proposition composed of those elements says that Wittgenstein is shorter than Frege, instead of saying that Frege is shorter than Wittgenstein, or even, e.g.,

that Shorter-Than freges Wittgenstein?

Moreover, if whatever it is that establishes the unity of the proposition, by relating all the elements to one another in a certain way (let’s call that “the relating relation”), is itself another object, hence a fourth object, then yet another fifth object is required to relate all three original objects and the relating relation to one another, and so-on and so forth viciously ad infinitum.

This is sometimes called Bradley’s Regress, after F.H. Bradley, who used it to argue, by reductio, for absolute idealism via the necessary internality of all relations to absolute wholes.

In any case, Russell‘s answer to the unity problem is that the mind of the person making a judgment relates the several parts of the proposition to one another by multiply acquainting herself with those objects in a certain order, thereby stopping the threatened regress right then and there.

So a judgment is essentially a psychological relation between a judging subject and the things in the world that constitute the elements of the proposition.

Then the proposition is true if and only if the things do indeed stand in just that ordered relation to each other in the actual world, and false if and only if they do not stand in just that relation.

The judgment thus “corresponds” to reality by means of the judging subject’s act of psychologically identifying its propositional constituents and their relations, with real-world objects and their relations.

The obvious problem with this proposed solution to the unity-of-the-proposition problem is that it entails solipsistic psychologism at the level of judgment.

How ironic — not to mention revolting — that the Moorean/Russellian “revolt against idealism” would ultimately end up in psychologism and solipsism.

IV.9 Russellian Analysis, Early Wittgenstein, and Impredicativity Again

Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant . . . I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly persuaded . . . that only by analysing is progress possible.[iv]

But that tells only part of the story about Russellian analysis.

In fact Russell‘s program of philosophical analysis had fundamentally collapsed by 1914, mainly as the result of his tumultuous personal and philosophical encounters with his erstwhile student and then collaborator Wittgenstein, in 1912 and 1913:

[Wittgenstein] had a kind of purity which I have never known equalled except by G. E. Moore. . . . He used to come to see me every evening at midnight, and pace up and down my room like a wild beast for three hours in agitated silence. Once I said to him: ―Are you thinking about logic or about your sins? “Both,” he replied, and continued his pacing. I did not like to suggest that it was time for bed, as it seemed probable both to him and me that on leaving me he would commit suicide.[v]

From 1912 to 1914 Wittgenstein was ostensibly Russell’s research student, working with him on the philosophy of logic and the logical foundations of mathematics, and supposedly becoming Russell‘s philosophical successor.

But the student, who was as personally difficult as he was philosophically brilliant, soon very helpfully pointed out to his teacher the irreversible philosophical errors in his work-in-progress, Theory of Knowledge.[vi]

The fundamental error was Russell’s Meinongian idea that the logical constants, the vehicles of logical form, are themselves logical objects of some sort, belonging to the proposition in the same way that simple concrete particulars and simple abstract universals belong to the proposition.

But how can the logical form of a proposition, its intrinsic form or structure, also be one of the contents or constituents of the very same proposition?

The problem is that if the logical form or structure of a proposition is also treated as one of the propositional constituents, then there will necessarily be a logical and ontological vicious infinite regress whereby new higher-order structures are endlessly or unrestrictedly generated in order to bind lower-order structures to the other basic or zero-level constituents of the proposition.

Nowadays logicians and set theorists call this sort of logico-ontological regress impredicativity, and as I’ve noted in section II.7 above, at least some cases of impredicativity are vicious — even if some other cases are benign.

But as Heidegger might have put it with essentially the same explanatory force, the philosophical error of confusing logical form or propositional structure with logical objects or propositional constituents is confusing Being with beings.

This fundamental distinction is what he calls “ontological difference.”[vii]

Or as Kant might have put it with an even greater explanatory force, vicious impredicativity is the logically chaotic result of confusing transcendental logical conditions for the possibility of judging or thinking objects with judgeable or thinkable objects themselves.

So vicious impredicativity is what happens when you confuse the transcendental with the empirical.

Vicious impredicativity first burst on the logico-mathematical scene with Russell’s stunning discovery of the paradox of classes or sets that’s produced by Frege’s notorious axiom V in the Basic Laws of Arithmetic.

As I mentioned above, axiom V is a principle for unrestrictedly generating classes from the extensions of concepts, which in turn are functions from objects to truth-values.

Russell exploited axiom V in order to yield the class of all classes not members of themselves, which in turn is necessarily a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself.

And as I also mentioned above, this is not only a contradiction, it’s a hyper-contradiction.

From a mere contradiction you can always infer the falsity of one or more of the premises from which that contradiction is logically validly derived.

But a hyper-contradiction, or paradox, is a contradiction such that the premises from which that contradiction is logically validly derived, are themselves contradictory.

So all the propositions essentially involved in that chain of reasoning are equally true and false, hence “truth value gluts,” and necessarily, true if and only if they are false.

So there is literally, logically, no way out.

This is what Kant called an antinomy, and as he stressed in the Dialectic of Pure Reason section in the first Critique, an antinomy is always a complete philosophical disaster.

For Frege and Russell alike, the discovery of the paradox was an unmitigated personal and philosophical disaster.

Frege was stopped dead in his tracks, tragically writing to Russell in 1902, as I mentioned above, that “logic totters,” and that

your discovery of the contradiction has surprised me beyond words, and I should like to say, thunderstruck.[viii]

Sadly, Frege remained thunderstruck and never did fundamental logical work on the foundations of mathematics again.

Even the much younger Russell, then at the very peak of his amazing logical powers and his philosophical self-confidence, was flummoxed for several months.[ix]

To be sure, as I mentioned in section IV.5, Russell-the-philosophical-juggernaut eventually produced several putative solutions for the paradox, including the no-class theory (which eliminates classes in favor of propositional functions), the vicious circle principle (which bans all impredicativity), and the Theory of Types (which systematically organizes classes and their memberships into logically benign distinct levels in a well-ordered hierarchy).

But it was all to no avail, and the general problem of vicious impredicativity, of which Russell’s paradox was only a particularly nasty instance, ultimately blew Russell‘s philosophy apart.

So much for the reliability of his logician‘s “feeling for reality.”

In any case, Wittgenstein‘s relentless criticism changed Russell‘s philosophical life, and he abandoned Theory of Knowledge shortly thereafter:

I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticised with the greatest severity[.] His criticism . . . was an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater. . . . I had to produce lectures for America, but I took a metaphysical subject although I was and am convinced that all fundamental work in philosophy is logical. My reason was that Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me. So there was really no vital satisfaction of my philosophical impulse in that work, and philosophy lost its hold on me. That was due to Wittgenstein more than to the war.[x]

Despite having his fundamental philosophical impulse shattered to pieces against a breakwater, Russell nevertheless promptly sat down and wrote Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) for his Lowell Lectures at Harvard.

This was characteristically Russellian, and as Ray Monk notes, “rarely can Russell have passed a day in his long lifetime… without writing, in one form or another, two or three thousand words.”[xi]

But leaving aside Russell‘s characteristic self-dramatization and his amazing logocentric libido, the two simple facts of the matter are that Wittgenstein had seriously challenged four fundamental elements of Russell‘s seminal conception of analysis, and that Russell had no effective reply to Wittgenstein‘s challenges.

Recall that Russell‘s notion of analysis in the period from 1900 to 1913 was logicistic, platonistic, radically realistic, and grounded epistemically on a series of self-evident infallible acquaintances with the simple concrete or abstract constituents of propositions and also with the logical constants, the vehicles of logical form.

The first problem with this notion is that Russell never provides an adequate explanation of how a human mind in real time and space can be directly related to causally inert non-spatio-temporal universals (the problem of non-empirical knowledge).

A second problem, already previewed, is how propositions construed as ordered complexes of individuals, properties, and relations, along with logical constants such as all, some, and, or, not, and if-then, can ever be formally or materially unified into coherent, semantically unambiguous truth-bearers (the problem of the unity of the proposition).

A third problem, also already previewed, is that the notion of a direct self-evident infallible acquaintance with logical constants, as if they were regular objects and propositional constituents alongside real individuals, properties, and relations, also leads to vicious impredicativity (the problem of the nature of the logical constant).

And a fourth and final problem is that Russell never adequately clarifies the nature or status of logical necessity, and in particular whether logical truths are analytic a priori, synthetic a priori, or something else (the problem of the nature of necessity).

To be sure, all four problems had already been handled by Kant by means of his transcendental idealism:

(i) non-empirical knowledge is based on transcendental reflection or self-knowledge,

(ii) the unity of the proposition is based on the transcendental unity of apperception,

(iii) logical constants are nothing but universal a priori or transcendental functions of thought, corresponding to higher-order pure concepts of the understanding, and

(iv) logical necessity is irreducibly analytic necessity, not synthetic necessity.

But it was precisely the Kantian approach that Russell was completely rejecting.

So these possible solutions to his problems were already ruled out, and as a consequence Russell‘s fundamental philosophical impulse, like a wave against against a Wittgenstein-constructed breakwater, was literally dashed to pieces — or more precisely, into logical atoms.

IV.10 Russell and The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

Russell and Wittgenstein were personally and politically divided by World War I.

Russell very bravely professed pacifism in a nation hell-bent on smashing the Germans, and was imprisoned by the British government and lost his Trinity fellowship — a bellicose and by now philosophically alienated McTaggart working hard to bring this about — for his troubles.

Wittgenstein went back to Austria, fought bravely on the German side on the Eastern Front, and was imprisoned by the Allies in Italy after the German surrender for his troubles.

Back in England however, by the end of The Great War Russell had completely capitulated to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical analysis.

He officially recorded the details of this conversion in his long essay, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”:

The following is the text of a course of eight lectures delivered in Gordon Square London, in the first months of 1918, which are very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learned from my friend and former pupil, Ludwig Wittgenstein. I have had no opportunity of knowing his views since August, 1914, and I do not even know whether he is alive or dead.[xii]

Wittgenstein was indeed alive, if not altogether well, seeing frontline action on the Eastern Front and then imprisoned in Italy, but in any case writing, writing, writing his iconoclastic masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.


[ii] Russell, “On Denoting,” pp. 49–50.

[iii] See, e.g., R. Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), sections 1.4, 4.3, and 4.4.

[iv] B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 14–15.

[v] B. Russell, Autobiography (London: Unwin, 1975), p. 330.

[vi] See E.R. Eames, “Introduction,” in B. Russell, Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. vii-xxxvii, at pp. xiv-xx.

[vii] See M Heidegger, Being and Time, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Introduction; and M. Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 150–154.

[viii] See R. Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), p. 153.

[ix] See Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, pp. 142–199.

[x] Russell, Autobiography, p. 282.

[xi] Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, p. xvii.

[xiii] B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in Russell, Logic and Knowledge, pp. 177–281, at p. 177.


Mr Nemo, W, X, Y, & Z, Tuesday 28 April 2020

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