Many thanks for the question.

This much-discussed example from the Jaesche Logic is not one of Kant’s greatest philosophical moments, that, for various reasons, he probably should have had excised from Jaesche’s text before publication.

As far as cognitive semantics is concerned, Kant’s/Jaesche’s use of this example fails to distinguish between (i) weak non-conceptuality, which is when a cognitive subject is sensibly aware of something but lacks the possession of specifically identifying concept for that sort of thing, even though they have fully operative conceptual capacities, & could also subsume it under more general concepts, which they do indeed possess & (ii) strong non-conceptuality, which is when a cognitive subject is sensibly aware of something, but lacks conceptual capacities altogether, hence lacks the possession of any concepts for the characterization of that thing, no matter how specific or general the concepts.

As it stands, the example is only a case of weak non-conceptuality, although Kant/Jaesche’s description of it strongly suggests that he/they think it demonstrates strong non-conceptuality.

In any case, in order to demonstrate strong non-conceptuality, Kant should have cited, for example, human infant perception (say, of a caregiver’s smiling face right in front of it), or non-human animal perception (say, a squirrel’s awareness of an acorn right in front of it, ready to be picked up), since both are cases in which sense perception occurs , yet (arguably) neither kind of cognitive subject has conceptual capacities, & therefore neither possesses any concepts.

And indeed, in other texts, Kant correctly uses “babes-or-beasts” examples to demonstrate strong non-conceptuality.